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FEMALE INFERTILITY IN THE WORKPLACE: UNDERSTANDING THE 
SCOPE OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT  
JEANNE HAYES 
 
Pregnancy discrimination was once used to marginalize female 
workers.  Today, infertility discrimination is used in much the same way.  
Employers often refuse to accommodate infertile women who request time 
off to undergo fertility treatments, forcing them to choose between family 
and work.  Employers have even terminated infertile women because of 
their potential to strain company resources over a prolonged period of 
time.  In addition, employer-funded health plans rarely provide coverage 
for fertility treatments, leaving infertile working women at a disadvantage 
compared to their pregnant counterparts. The Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act expanded Title VII’s definition of sex discrimination to include 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions, but it did not define “related medical conditions.”  This Note 
argues that infertility is a medical condition related to pregnancy for the 
purposes of the PDA and advocates that Congress clarify that 
sex discrimination includes infertility discrimination. 
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FEMALE INFERTILITY IN THE WORKPLACE: UNDERSTANDING THE 
SCOPE OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT 
JEANNE HAYES* 
I’m hurt, hurt and humiliated beyond endurance, seeing the crops 
ripen, the fountains give water endlessly, the ewes bear scores of lambs, 
and the bitches pups, till the whole countryside seems to rise up and show 
me its tender sleeping young, while I feel two hammer-blows here, instead 
of a child’s mouth.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, NBC correspondent Maria Shriver called childlessness “The 
Curse of the Career Woman.”2  Shriver was acknowledging a prominent 
social trend that persists today.  Women intent on advancing their careers 
are increasingly waiting until later in life to have children.3  But postponing 
childbearing adversely affects female fertility.  A woman aged thirty-five 
to forty-four is twice as likely to be infertile as is a woman aged thirty to 
thirty-four.4  Even at the relatively young age of thirty, up to ninety percent 
of a woman’s eggs are gone.5 
There are now more women in the workforce battling infertility than 
ever before.6  Today, approximately 6.1 million women of childbearing age 
                                                                                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law.  I would like to thank Professor Peter 
Siegelman, Roger Sherman Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law, for his 
suggestions, and most importantly, his criticisms.  I would also like to thank Drew Barber for 
encouraging me to submit this Note.  Finally, thank you to my parents, Helen and Lawrence Hayes, for 
always giving me the freedom to think outside the box. 
1 FEDERICO GARCÍA LORCA, YERMA, act II, sc. 2. (A.S. Kline trans., 2007) (1934). 
2 SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH 104–05 (1991).  See also SANDRA FREDMAN, WOMEN AND THE 
LAW 127 (1997) (noting that after World War II, childless women were increasingly able to penetrate 
traditionally male occupations, while women with children remained in “positions of disadvantage”). 
3 See Leslie Sowers, Wanted: A Child of Our Own, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 25, 1996, at 1 
(describing the problems inherent in the trend toward later childbearing); see also FREDMAN, supra 
note 2, at 180 (discussing why women are delaying childbearing, namely, the “deepening gulf between 
the labour market position of women with children and those without”); U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Changes in Women’s Labor Force Participation in the 20th Century, THE EDITOR’S DESK, 
Feb. 16, 2000, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/opub/ted/2000/Feb/wk3/art03.htm (showing the 
increase in female labor force participation from 1950 to 1998). 
4 Sowers, supra note 3. 
5 Roger Fortuna & Suzan Clarke, For Women Who Want Kids, ‘The Sooner the Better’: 90 
Percent of Eggs Gone by Age 30, ABC NEWS, Jan. 29, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/OnCall/ 
women-fertility-falls-lose-90-percent-eggs-30/story?id=9693015. 
6 The increased number of women in the workforce battling infertility is attributable to their 
increased participation in the workforce, not increased incidences of infertility.  See also ETHEL 
SLOANE, BIOLOGY OF WOMEN 390 (1985) (noting one study that suggested women should devote their 
twenties to childbearing and their thirties to career development in order to prevent age-related 
infertility). 
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are battling infertility; of these, almost seventy percent are in the 
workforce.7  The number of infertile women in the workforce is expected 
to increase: female labor force participation is anticipated to climb to over 
seventy-five percent by 2020.8 
Twenty percent of infertile women will undergo time-consuming and 
costly fertility treatments that are generally much more burdensome for 
women than men.9  But this decision creates new professional and 
economic problems.  First, employers have fired or refused to 
accommodate women requesting time off for time-consuming fertility 
treatments.10  Second, even if women receive the necessary time off, 
employer-funded health plans rarely provide coverage for the costly 
treatments.11 
These problems are acute, even thirty years after passage of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”).12  The PDA amended Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimination “because of or 
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”13  
Thus, the threshold question is “[w]hether the PDA’s prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and ‘related medical conditions’ 
extends to discrimination on the basis of infertility.”14  This Note posits 
that it does.  
To date, the only U.S. Courts of Appeals to have considered this 
questionthe Second, Eighth, and Seventh Circuitsagree that the PDA 
                                                                                                                          
7 OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INFERTILITY (2009), 
available at http://www.womenshealth.gov/faq/infertility.pdf. The most illustrative labor force 
participation statistics available for female workers of childbearing age reveals that in 2005, 
approximately 69.26% of females aged 16–44 participated in the labor force.  Abraham Mosisa & 
Steven Hipple, Trends in Labor Force Participation in the United States, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 
2006, at 35, 40, 46. 
8 See OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, supra note 7. The projected 2020 mean labor force 
participation rate for women aged 16–44 is approximately 76.5%.  Mitra Toossi, A Century of Change: 
The U.S. Labor Force 1950–2050, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2002, at 15, 22. 
9 Becky Ham, Money Matters when Choosing Fertility Treatments, Study Finds, HEALTH BEHAV. 
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 22, 2006. 
10 See Hall v. Nalco Co. (Nalco II), 534 F.3d 644, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
plaintiff stated a cognizable claim of pregnancy discrimination because she was terminated for 
undergoing fertility treatments after being told she could not take time off); LaPorta v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 760, 771 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that an employer’s refusal to 
accommodate a woman’s request to take time off to undergo fertility treatments did not constitute 
discrimination); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1402–03 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding 
that an employer unlawfully terminated a woman undergoing fertility treatments). 
11 See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 193−96 (2006) (describing the 
lack of legislation requiring employer-funded health insurance coverage for fertility treatments). 
12 Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
(2006)). 
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (emphasis added). 
14 Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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does not prohibit employment decisions based on infertility.15  The 
holdings of the Second16 and Eighth17 Circuits are premised on dicta from a 
U.S. Supreme Court decision, United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, 
which suggests that classifications based on fertilityand by like 
implication, infertilitydo not constitute sex discrimination because both 
men and women can be fertile or infertile.18 
In July 2008, the Seventh Circuit similarly held that the PDA does not 
cover infertility.  But the Seventh Circuit diverged from the Eighth and 
Second Circuits by engaging in a novel, albeit problematic, analysis.19  In 
Hall v. Nalco (“Nalco II”), the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs could 
seek protection under the PDA for discrimination based on gender-specific 
fertility treatments, but not for discrimination based on gender-neutral 
infertility.20  The court found that assisted reproductive technologies, such 
as in-vitro fertilization (“IVF”), require surgical impregnation that will 
always affect women, not men, thus making them gender-specific, not  
gender-neutral.21 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision swung the pendulum closer to 
recognizing infertile females as a protected class, but regrettably stopped 
short.22  Nalco II limits protection to only those infertile women who are 
actively getting fertility treatment; infertile women who have not yet 
received treatment are outside the scope of protection.  Under Nalco II, an 
infertile woman who reveals her intention to become pregnant, but not the 
specific nature of her fertility treatments, can still be fired.  In addition, 
under Nalco II, an employer is still under no obligation to provide 
coverage for infertility, even if it provides an otherwise inclusive health 
benefit plan.23  So long as infertility is considered gender-neutral, an 
employer’s health plan excluding coverage for infertility is legal. 
                                                                                                                          
15 See Nalco II, 534 F.3d at 648−49 (holding that discrimination based solely on infertility, and 
not infertility treatments, is not protected by the PDA); Saks, 316 F.3d at 348−49 (holding that 
infertility is a gender-neutral condition and therefore falls outside the scope of protections afforded by 
the PDA); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th  Cir. 1996) (same).  
16 Saks, 316 F.3d at 348. 
17 Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680. 
18 See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991) (“Johnson 
Controls’ policy [violates Title VII because it] classifies on the basis of gender and childbearing 
capacity, rather than fertility alone.”). 
19 See Nalco II, 534 F.3d at 648 n.1 (acknowledging that the court’s holding rested on an analysis 
different from that of Krauel). 
20 Id. at 648−49. 
21 Id. 
22 See id. at 648, 648 n.1 (declining to disagree with the Court’s holding in Johnson Controls that 
infertility is not covered by the PDA because it is a gender-neutral condition). 
23 It is discriminatory to exclude pregnancy coverage from an otherwise inclusive insurance plan 
because pregnancy is related to sex for purposes of the PDA.  In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Supreme Court 
accepted the cost-justifications of the defendant employer and upheld the constitutionality of excluding 
pregnancy coverage under California’s disability insurance plan.  417 U.S. 484, 496, 496 n.20 (1974).  
The Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert relied on Geduldig and found that an exclusion of 
pregnancy from a disability benefits plan providing general coverage was not gender-based 
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Part II of this Note explains the physical, psychological, and economic 
costs of infertility, as well as its relationship to the workplace, paying 
attention to the disproportionate burdens placed on women, as opposed to 
men.  Part III details the legislative history of Title VII and the PDA, 
particularly as it relates to infertility.  Part IV addresses the significance of 
Johnson Controls and the contrasting circuit court decisions, including 
Nalco II, and focuses on the arguments both for and against recognition of 
infertility under the PDA.  Part V argues that Nalco II is but a small victory 
for patients undergoing fertility treatments and provides an incomplete 
solution for infertile women because it does not require employers to offer 
insurance coverage for infertility.  Part VI advocates for Congress to 
clarify that the PDA unequivocally protects infertility, in addition to 
women undergoing fertility treatments.  Until then, Part VII offers practical 
advice to working women navigating infertility in the workplace. 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF INFERTILITY 
A.  Infertility as a Medical Problem 
Although a medical analysis of infertility is outside the scope of this 
Note, some background information is necessary to understand the special 
challenges that infertile women face.  Each year in the United States, 6.1 
million women, or roughly ten percent of women of childbearing age, 
battle infertility.24  The medical definition of infertility is a “failure to 
achieve pregnancy during one year of frequent, unprotected intercourse.”25  
Doctors can determine the cause of infertility in eighty percent of 
couples.26  In those cases, female factors cause approximately one-third of 
                                                                                                                          
discrimination.  429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976).  Thereafter, the PDA clarified that pregnancy was related to 
sex and that it was therefore illegal to treat pregnancy-related conditions differently from other medical 
conditions in a benefit plan.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).  See also Newport News Shipbuilding & 
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 677–78 (1983) (describing this evolution in discrimination law).  
24 For the purpose of this statistic, “childbearing age” includes only women aged 15–44.  See 
OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, supra note 7. 
25 Alaina B. Jose-Miller et al., Infertility, 75 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 849, 849 (2007).  Despite this 
definition, many states have their own statutory definitions of infertility.  For example, New Jersey 
defines infertility as follows: 
[T]he disease or condition that results in the abnormal function of the reproductive 
system such that a person is not able to: impregnate another person; conceive after 
two years of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is under 35 years of age, 
or one year of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is 35 years of age or 
older or one of the partners is considered medically sterile; or carry a pregnancy to 
live birth. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x (West 2008).  Connecticut defines infertility as “the condition of a 
presumably healthy individual who is unable to conceive or produce conception or sustain a successful 
pregnancy during a one-year period.”  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (2007). 
26 ACCESS: Australia’s National Infertility Network, About Infertility, http://www.access.org.au/ 
about_infertility (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
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infertility and male factors cause one-third of infertility.27  The remaining 
one-third of infertility is caused by a combination of male and female 
factors.28  Female factors that cause infertility include increased age, tubal 
dysfunction, uterine abnormality, irregular ovulation, and 
hypothyroidism.29  Male factors that cause infertility include increased age, 
testicular dysfunction, low sperm vitality or production, irregular hormone 
levels, and ejaculation problems.30 
Although infertility has long been a problem,31 advanced treatment 
options have only recently become available.  Medical treatment of 
infertility involves the administration of medication, surgical procedures, 
or both.32  Although infertility is caused equally by male and female 
factors, treatments are often more grueling for women (even if the cause is 
male-factor infertility), and are not always successful.33  Women must 
often commit a larger amount of time to treatments and suffer more side 
effects than men.34  This creates asymmetry in the world of infertility: 
while both men and women experience infertility, women bear the brunt of 
time-consuming and costly treatments. 
For example, physicians often start the battle against infertility by 
prescribing an oral medication such as Clomid, which stimulates follicle 
hormones, for the female partner.35  Even then, doctors often require 
women to make frequent visits to hospitals to monitor follicular 
development via ultrasound.36  If a patient fails to become pregnant, 
physicians then typically recommend intrauterine insemination (“IUI”) in 
which a doctor introduces sperm into the female uterus via a catheter (i.e., 
fertilization occurs inside the body).37  If IUI and other methods fail to 
achieve pregnancy, then doctors may recommend that a woman undergo 
                                                                                                                          
27 OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, supra note 7. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Cindy Pan, Sussing Out the Swimmers, SUNDAY MAIL (Austl.), Sept. 7, 2008, at 6. 
31 The Book of Genesis describes the plight of Abraham’s infertile wife, Sarah.  So desperate for a 
child was she that she sent her husband to sleep with her handmaiden.  Genesis 16:1–2 (King James).  
See also DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE 
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 6–13 (2006) (describing the long history of female infertility). 
32 See JACQUELINE TOMLINS, THE INFERTILITY HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO MAKING BABIES 
100−04 (2004). 
33 The success rate for one round of fertility treatments is only about twenty-eight percent.  CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2005 ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 6 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ 
ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf.  In 2005, of the 134,260 assisted reproductive technology 
fertility treatments, there were 38,910 live births.  Id. at 11. 
34 See TOMLINS, supra note 32, at 102. 
35 Jose-Miller et al., supra note 25, at 850. 
36 DukeHealth.org, Care Guides: Fertility, Clomid, http://www.dukehealth.org/health_library/ 
care_guides/fertility/medications/clomid (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
37 RESOLVE: The National Fertility Association, Intrauterine Insemination, http://www.resolve. 
org/site/PageServer?pagename=lrn_wamo_IUI (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
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IVF, a procedure in which an egg is fertilized outside of the body and then 
implanted into the woman’s uterus.38 
In fact, it was the emergence of IVF in the mid-to-late twentieth 
century that brought infertility out of the closet and into the public 
consciousness.39  In 1978, the same year as the passage of the PDA, the 
first IVF child, Baby Louise, was born in Britain.40  Louise’s mother had 
been unable to conceive naturally, so doctors collected her eggs, fertilized 
them with her husband’s sperm in an artificial environment, and implanted 
the fertilized egg back into her uterus.41  This same procedure would be 
performed for the first time in the United States just three years later.42  As 
one commentator noted, this “‘miracle of science’ has become just another 
technique in the medical arsenal.”43  According to Stephanie Greco, 
Director of Communications for RESOLVE, the National Infertility 
Association, IVF has raised infertility “awareness, so people are beginning 
to feel it’s O.K. to get help, rather than to feel totally isolated and 
helpless.”44 
While IVF can produce miracles, it is grueling for women, both 
physically and emotionally.  IVF requires the female patient to have 
numerous pelvic exams and to take ovary-stimulating drugs via painful 
injections that often cause mood swings.45  Almost daily, the female patient 
must have blood drawn to monitor hormone levels.46  Ultrasound 
examinations must frequently be performed on the female’s eggs.47  The 
procedures must often be done on a moment’s notice, leaving little 
opportunity for advance planning and causing strain on women with work 
commitments.48  A typical timeline for a woman undergoing IVF is as 
follows: 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
38 JOHN YEH & MOLLY ULINE YEH, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INFERTILITY 62 (1991); Saul Spigel, 
Infertility: Causes, Treatment, Insurance and Disability Status (Conn. Gen. Assembly Office of 
Legislative Research Report No. 2005-R-0145, 2005), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/ 
2005-R-0145.htm. 
39 Laurie Tarkan, Fertility Clinics Begin To Address Mental Health, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2002, at 
F5.  
40 MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL, LAW, ETHICS AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 1 (1994). 
41 Id. 
42 PBS, Test Tube Babies Timeline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/ 
timeline/babies/2/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
43 Sowers, supra note 3. 
44 Tarkan, supra note 39. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 In one case, doctors informed the patient on a Friday that she was ready for egg retrieval that 
had to occur on Monday.  The patient advised her employer that she needed that day off, but her 
employer refused because a replacement could not be found on such short notice.  LaPorta v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 (W.D. Mich. 2001). 
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Day 1:  First day of menses 
Day 2:  Start of ovulation induction 
Day 6:  Start of monitoring for estrogen levels and follicular 
growth until ideal levels are obtained 
36 Hours After Ideal Follicular Growth Levels Are Obtained: 
Follicles retrieved from female and sperm obtained from 
male; fertilization of eggs outside uterus  
48 Hours After Oocyte Retrieval:  Transfer of embryos to 
female 
Next Two Days:  Bed rest[49] 
2 Weeks After Oocyte Retrieval:  Pregnancy test50 
An IVF cycle is successful only twenty-five percent of the time; more 
often than not, a woman must undergo subsequent rounds of IVF treatment 
to achieve pregnancy in order to become pregnant.51 
The time-consuming procedures and often discouraging results can 
take a significant psychological toll on women.  Dr. Nada Stotland, 
Professor of Psychiatry at Rush Medical College in Chicago, notes that 
“women regard infertility as the most disastrous thing that’s ever happened 
to them.”52  One woman who was required to undergo many medical 
procedures, even though it was her husband who was infertile, explained 
her resentment:  “I felt like he had the cancer and I was taking the 
chemo.”53  Because of the stressful nature of fertility treatments, many 
fertility clinics have now begun to address the mental health of their female 
patients.54  Even though stress alone does not cause female infertility, it 
can trigger irregular menstruation, thereby creating a vicious cycle of stress 
and infertility.55 
Many couples exhaust their savings or go into debt to pay for these 
expensive treatments, and often treatments must be tried again.56  Because 
                                                                                                                          
49 Sue Shellenbarger, Women Battling Infertility Find a Friend in the Court, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
13, 2008, at D1. 
50 YEH & YEH, supra note 38, at 62. 
51 See Spigel, supra note 38. 
52 Tarkan, supra note 39. 
53 Sowers, supra note 3. 
54 See Tarkan, supra note 39 (describing Boston IVF’s Mind/Body Center for Women’s Health, 
which opened in 2002 and teaches women stress management and other ways of coping with the 
emotional issues of infertility). 
55 Randi Hutter Epstein, A Low-Tech Approach to Fertility: Just Relax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 
2007, at F6. 
56 See Tarkan, supra note 39 (describing that the high cost of IVF means that some couples must 
choose between one cycle of IVF or adoption).  In 1998, Rochelle Saks and her husband went into debt 
after they discovered her employer would not cover her $10,000 fertility treatments.  Jane Gross, The 
Fight To Cover Infertility; Suit Says Employer’s Refusal To Pay Is a Form of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 
1998, at B1. 
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there are no reporting requirements, the exact cost of fertility treatments is 
unknown.57  The American Society of Reproductive Medicine estimates 
that one round of IUI can cost anywhere from $275 to $2457, and one 
round of IVF costs in excess of $12,000.58 
The scope of insurance coverage varies considerably among states, as 
does the definition of infertility.59  Infertility laws generally fall into one of 
two groups: a “mandate to cover” or a “mandate to offer.”  A mandate to 
cover requires that insurance companies provide coverage for infertility 
treatments as a benefit included in every policy.60  Only ten states mandate 
coverage for fertility treatments.61  In those states, an employee must meet 
certain requirements to qualify for coverage.  Examples of qualifying 
requirements include the following: (1) the fertilization attempt must be 
made with the spouse’s sperm;62 and (2) the patient must have used all 
reasonable, less expensive, and medically appropriate treatments before 
IVF.63  This second requirement has the consequence of encouraging 
women to undergo less effective treatment, so long as it is reasonable, 
merely because it is covered under their insurance plans.64  Some states 
that provide coverage for infertility treatments specifically exclude IVF.  
New York, for example, requires insurers to provide coverage for 
infertility drugs so long as they typically provide coverage for prescription 
drugs, but does not require coverage for more expensive procedures such 
as IVF.65  Other states impose lifetime limits; Illinois, for example, limits 
coverage for egg retrievals to four attempts.66  These limits greatly reduce 
the value of infertility laws.  The ABC morning show The View ran a 
                                                                                                                          
57 KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 11, at 193 n.2. 
58 See Barbara Collura, The Costs of Infertility Treatment, FAM. BUILDING, Summer 2006, 
available at http://www.resolve.org/site/PageServer?pagename=lrn_mta_cost (breaking down the costs 
of IUI and IVF in terms of surgery and medications); see also KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 11, 
at 193 n.2 (noting that the high cost of American fertility treatments has led many Americans to seek 
less costly fertility treatments in countries such as Germany, Israel, Columbia, France, South Africa, 
and Singapore). 
59 KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 11, at 197−98, 200. 
60 RESOLVE: The National Fertility Association, Health Insurance 101, http://www.resolve.org/ 
site/PageServer?pagename=lrn_ic_101 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
61 These include: Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New 
Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island.  Janet L. Kaminski, Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment 
(Conn. Gen. Assembly Office of Legislative Research Report No. 2005-R-0236, 2005), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-R-0236.htm.  See also Chen May Yee & Josephine Marcotty, 
Miracles for Sale, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 22, 2007, at 1A (discussing the various ways that 
couples finance fertility treatments). 
62 HAW. REV. STAT. § 432:1-604(3) (2005); Kaminski, supra note 61. 
63 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m (West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27-46.1x (West 
2006); Kaminski, supra note 61. 
64 Gross, supra note 56. 
65 N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3221(k)(6), 4303(s) (McKinney 2006).  For more information on state 
specific laws, see RESOLVE: The National Fertility Association, Infertility Coverage in Your State, 
http://www.resolve.org/site/PageServer?pagename=lrn_ic_stintro (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (discussing 
fifteen states’ infertility insurance laws).  
66 Infertility Coverage in Your State, supra note 65. 
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segment on infertility in February 2010.67  One woman complained that 
although she had insurance coverage, she had exhausted her lifetime 
infertility benefits in just three months, from June to August.68  A mandate 
to offer, in contrast, only requires that insurance companies make available 
for purchase a policy that covers infertility treatment; employers are under 
no obligation to purchase the plans.69  Five states (California, Connecticut, 
Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia) currently require insurers to offer fertility 
treatment coverage to group health plan sponsors.70 
But even in the fifteen states that have a mandate to cover or a mandate 
to offer, the federal ERISA statute preempts state law, thereby precluding 
employers with self-funded health plans from falling within the scope of 
the statute.71  Because they are not required to offer coverage, these 
employers have been reluctant to do so, fearing it would cause employee 
premiums to increase.72  Consequently, many couples face the daunting 
task of paying for fertility treatments themselves, often going into extreme 
debt to do so, or declining treatment all together.73 
B.  Infertility as a Work Problem: Putting Employers on Guard 
In addition to the negative physical and psychological side effects of 
treatment, there are professional consequences as well.  Of the 6.1 million 
women battling infertility, approximately seventy percent are employed.74  
Those in need of time-consuming fertility treatments face a fundamental 
problem: fertility treatments require the patient to have a flexible schedule, 
something many working women lack.75  
For example, if a blood test indicates that a patient has a forty-eight-
hour window in which to undergo impregnation procedures, then there is 
relatively little opportunity for advanced planning.76  It is now or never.  
And therein lies the conundrum: the female worker must decide whether to 
place her career in jeopardy by asking her employer for a more flexible or 
                                                                                                                          
67 The View (ABC television broadcast Feb. 25, 2010). 
68 Id. 
69 Health Insurance 101, supra note 60. 
70 Kaminski, supra note 61. 
71 KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 11, at 200. 
72 See Yee & Marcotty, supra note 61. 
73 Id. 
74 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
75 In 2004, only 26.7% of women and 28.1% of men worked flexible schedules that allowed them 
to alter the time they began or ended work.  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Flexible Work Schedules 
in 2004, THE EDITOR’S DESK, July 5, 2005, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2005/jul/wk1/art01.htm.  For 
further discussion of the impact workplace flexibility has on women, see generally Vicki Schultz, 
Feminism and Workplace Flexibility, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1203 (2010). 
76 See LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (discussing 
a three-day time constraint on the plaintiff to undergo an egg harvesting procedure). 
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reduced work schedule.77  Not doing so could result in childlessness, but 
doing so can have significant professional consequences.  Many legal 
scholars have suggested and, indeed, some courts have found that 
employers often assume that a woman who reveals her desire to have a 
child is shifting her priorities from work to family.78  This revelation is 
especially problematic for the infertile woman: she must reveal both her 
desire to have a child and her inability to do so without recourse to 
expensive and time-consuming79 artificial treatment.  Thus, infertile 
women have the potential to strain companies’ resources more than fertile 
women, giving employers extra motive to terminate them. 
This is particularly true because the potential for the infertile woman to 
strain company resources can last in excess of the nine-month gestation 
period of traditional pregnant workers.80  Fertility treatments such as IVF 
have only a twenty-five percent success rate and often must be tried again, 
causing the pregnancy process to sometimes last for years.81  Women 
undergoing fertility treatments are in a prolonged, perpetual state of 
pregnancy in their employers’ eyes—one without a predictable end and 
one with the potential to strain resources indefinitely.82 
                                                                                                                          
77 Unlike the traditional pregnant employee who keeps her pregnancy under wraps until after the 
first trimester, infertile women are unique in that they are often forced to reveal a potential pregnancy 
before they are pregnant in order to secure the necessary time off.  Compare Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 
253 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the plaintiff did not disclose her pregnancy to her 
employer until she was seven months pregnant), with Nalco II, 534 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(describing an infertile woman who disclosed her condition to her supervisors before she became 
pregnant).  This request gives an employer notice that an employee is potentially pregnant. 
78 See Clay, 253 F.3d at 1009 (finding that hospital administration fired a pregnant doctor who 
they felt “lacked the drive, work ethic, and dedication”); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., No. 82-3156, 
1983 WL 612, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 1983) (finding the plaintiff’s “expressed desire to combine 
motherhood with her sales career was a determining factor in defendant’s decision to remove her” from 
her job); see also Kellee Boulais Kruse, The Protections Offered to Non-Pregnant Plaintiffs by the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act 5–8 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper No. 427, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1234702 (discussing this problem in detail as it relates to pregnant employees, infertile employees, and 
employees contemplating starting a family). 
79 See Sowers, supra note 3. 
80 For example, an infertile woman undergoing consecutive, unsuccessful infertility treatments 
may require considerable time off over a long period, and may need further accommodations if a 
treatment results in pregnancy. 
81 Tarkan, supra note 39. 
82 This perpetual state of pregnancy is similar to that which adoptive mothers experience.  See 
SHERRY F. COLB, WHEN SEX COUNTS: MAKING BABIES AND MAKING LAW 217 (2007).  Colb writes: 
In October 2002, I adopted a beautiful baby girl from China.  While I was 
waiting to learn when I would travel and who would become my new child, a 
colleague told me that I was “not showing yet.”  This joke comes back to me now.  
Because I was becoming a mother for the first time, the colleague thought of me as 
in a state of virtual pregnancy, one in which I would eventually begin “showing” but 
had not yet begun to do so. 
Id.  In the floor debate for the PDA, Senator Harrison Williams stated that employers’ different 
treatment of females because of their capacity to have children is exactly what the PDA intended to 
combat.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, at 61 (1979) 
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (“Because of their capacity to become pregnant, women have been 
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The likelihood that an infertile employee will strain company resources 
provides little incentive for an employer to accommodate or retain infertile 
female employees.83  As a result, preemptive termination—the firing of a 
woman who an employer suspects will drain company resources over a 
prolonged period of time—remains a major problem for the infertile 
woman.84 Although the number of claims alleging workplace 
discrimination against infertile women is unknown, case law and the 
increased use of fertility treatments suggests it is a problem that deserves 
attention.85 
III.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND THE PDA 
Does the PDA prohibit discrimination based on infertility?  Does it 
require insurance coverage for infertility?  The language of the PDA is 
vague, which proves to be a double-edged sword that can both help—and 
hurt—arguments for the protection of infertility.  Additionally, because 
time-consuming and costly fertility treatments such as IVF were not 
available in the United States at the time the PDA was enacted, the PDA’s 
legislative history is of limited use in discerning the legislature’s intent.86  
Nonetheless, an analysis of the legislative history and accompanying 
materials suggests that protection of infertility is consistent with the 
purpose of this remedial statute. 
Congress passed the PDA in response to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, which held that discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination.87  In Gilbert, the Supreme 
                                                                                                                          
viewed as marginal workers not deserving the full benefits of compensation and advancement. . . . In 
some of these cases, the employer refused to consider women for particular types of jobs on the 
grounds that they might become pregnant.”). 
83 See Nalco II, 534 F.3d 644, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2008) (involving a woman who was fired after she 
told her employer about her infertility); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1396–97 
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (involving a woman undergoing fertility treatments). 
84 The EEOC does not keep records of claims filed for discrimination on the basis of infertility, 
but in 2009 the EEOC received 6196 complaints alleging a violation of the PDA.  EEOC, Pregnancy 
Discrimination Charges, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/pregnancy.cfm (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2010). 
85 See L.A. Schieve et al., Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology—United States, 1996 and 
1998, 51 MMWR WEEKLY 97 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ 
mm5105a2.htm (describing how the utilization of fertility treatments increased more than twenty-five 
percent in a two-year span, between 1996 and 1998); see also Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 911 F. 
Supp. 1312, 1318 (D. Or. 1995) (“It is simply common sense to recognize that an employer may treat a 
female employee differently when it knows that she can or will become pregnant.”); Pacourek, 858 F. 
Supp. at 1400–01 (finding discrimination after an employee announced her intention to undergo 
fertility treatments); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., No. 82-3156, 1983 WL 612, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 
1983) (finding that the plaintiff’s “expressed desire to combine motherhood with her sales career was a 
determining factor in defendant’s decision to remove her”). 
86 The first American IVF baby was born on December 28, 1981.  PBS, supra note 42.  This was 
more than three years after passage of the PDA. 
87 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 128 (1976). 
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Court ruled in favor of General Electric’s disability plan, which excluded 
insurance coverage for women with pregnancy-related disabilities.88  The 
Court’s holding was based on the premise that the exclusion was 
condition-related, not sex-related.89  But Justice Brennan, in a strongly 
worded dissent, argued that “the Court’s assumption that General Electric 
engaged in a gender-neutral risk-assignment process is purely fanciful” 
since General Electric had a history of practices designed to undercut the 
achievement of women who became pregnant while employed.90  Justice 
Brennan further explained that plans excluding pregnancy coverage “both 
financially burden women workers and act to break down the continuity of 
the employment relationship, thereby exacerbating women’s comparatively 
transient role in the labor force.”91  Justice Stevens, in his own dissenting 
opinion, added that the plan was blatantly gender-based because “it is the 
capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female 
from the male.”92 
After Gilbert, Representative Augustus Hawkins sponsored a 1977 bill 
to clarify the scope of the word “sex” in Title VII’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination.93  Representative Hawkins was instrumental in passing 
Title VII and strongly believed that targeting discrimination in the 
workforce was necessary for the advancement of civil rights.94  Ninety-two 
members of the House of Representatives agreed with him and co-
sponsored the bill.95  The stated purpose of the bill was to add a new 
subsection to section 701—section 701(k)—that would “explicitly provide 
that the terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not 
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions.”96 
Wendy Williams, a professor at Georgetown Law School, submitted a 
prepared statement to the Committee on Education and Labor that 
encapsulates the main problem that women of childbearing age face in the 
workplace: all women of childbearing age are subject to the effects of the 
stereotype that they are marginal workers because “until a woman passes 
the childbearing age, she is viewed by employers as potentially 
                                                                                                                          
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 134.  This is the same premise that courts would later use to deny coverage for infertility 
treatment.  See infra notes 132–40 and accompanying text (discussing Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 
F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
90 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
91 Id. at 158 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
93 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 11–12. 
94 Black Americans in Congress, Augustus Freeman (Gus) Hawkins, http://baic.house.gov/ 
member-profiles/profile.html?intID=30 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
95 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 11. 
96 Id. at 13. 
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pregnant.”97  During the floor debate, Senator Alan Cranston emphasized  
that the bill did not give women special treatment; instead, pregnant 
workers able to work would be treated the same as other able workers, and 
pregnant workers unable to work would be treated the same as other 
disabled workers.98 
Despite calculations that mandating insurance coverage for pregnant 
women would cost an additional $1.7 billion each year,99 the bill passed in 
1978, and section 701(k) became known as the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act.  A milestone for women, the PDA prohibits an employer from: (1) 
refusing to hire a pregnant woman because of her pregnancy or pregnancy-
related condition, or because of the prejudices of co-workers, clients, or 
customers; and (2) singling out pregnancy-related conditions for specific 
procedures to determine an employee’s ability to work.100  The PDA 
further places an affirmative duty on employers to treat pregnancy-related 
medical conditions similarly to other medical conditions, both in terms of 
employment and with respect to employer-funded health plans.101 
But the PDA, which was intended to eradicate confusion by 
broadening the definition of sex discrimination to include pregnancy-based 
discrimination, caused confusion of its own.  Just what is a pregnancy-
related medical condition?  Must a woman be pregnant to have a related 
medical condition?  Is infertility included within the definition of 
pregnancy discrimination?  These questions, and others like them, would 
continue to confront courts in the years following passage of the PDA.102 
                                                                                                                          
97 Discrimination Based on Pregnancy: Hearing on S. 995 Before the Subcommittee on Labor, 
95th Cong. 1st Sess., 113–17 (Apr. 26, 1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 30; 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY FOUNDATIONS 128, 179 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1995). 
98 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 131. 
99 The Health Insurance Association of America provided this high estimate.  Id. at 46. 
100 EEOC, Facts About Pregnancy Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-
preg.cfm (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
101 Id. 
102 See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197 (1991) (finding that the 
PDA protects women even before they are pregnant); Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 347 
(2d Cir. 2003) (holding that infertility is a gender-neutral condition and therefore falls outside the scope 
of protections afforded by the PDA); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 
1996) (same); Panizzi v. City of Chicago Bd. of Educ., No. 07-C-846, 2007 WL 4233755, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 19, 2007) (holding that women who are not pregnant at the time of the adverse action are not 
protected by the PDA); La Porta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 770 (W.D. Mich. 2001) 
(finding that “[n]either the language nor the legislative history of the PDA reflects an intent to cover 
infertility”); Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 911 F. Supp. 1312, 1317–18 (D. Or. 1995) (holding that 
the PDA protects a female employee who informed her employer that she was undergoing fertility 
treatments, but who was not pregnant at the time of the termination); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 
F. Supp 1393, 1402–03 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that infertility is a pregnancy-related medical 
condition). 
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IV.  RELEVANT CASE LAW AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A.  The Supreme Court: Johnson Controls 
The Supreme Court has not decided a case involving the scope of the 
PDA since 1991, and that decision left many questions unanswered.  In 
United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, female employees brought a 
class action suit against their employer alleging Title VII sex 
discrimination.103  The employer, Johnson Controls, ran a battery 
manufacturing plant that processed lead.104  To protect fetuses in utero, 
Johnson Controls announced a policy barring only women, except those 
whose infertility was documented, from jobs involving high levels of lead 
exposure.105  The trial court considered whether this policy had a disparate 
impact on women.  Disparate impact is a basis of liability whereby an 
employer, even if it lacked discriminatory intent, becomes liable for a 
facially-neutral policy that has an adverse effect on members of a protected 
class.106  If the plaintiff establishes a disparate impact, then the employer 
must prove that the challenged practice is “job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity.”107 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, 
finding that the fertility policy, even though it caused a disparate impact, 
was a business necessity because it promoted workers’ safety.108  On 
appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that disparate impact was the correct 
basis of liability and noted that the outcome would have been the same 
even if the court had used a disparate treatment analysis.109  Disparate 
treatment, unlike disparate impact, requires that a plaintiff show, by direct 
or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had discriminatory intent 
when instituting a facially discriminatory policy.110  Facially 
discriminatory policies are only permitted if sex, national origin, or 
religion is a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.111  The 
                                                                                                                          
103 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 192. 
104 Id. at 190. 
105 Id. at 192.  The policy defined “women . . . capable of bearing children” as “[a]ll women 
except those whose inability to bear children is medically documented.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
106 See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 316 (E.D. Wis. 1988) 
(describing that, although a fetal protection policy was “facially neutral,” it had a disproportionate 
impact on women). 
107 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
108 Johnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. at 316–17. 
109 United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 893–94 (7th Cir. 1989), rev’d, 
499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
110 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (defining unlawful employer practices that may result in disparate 
treatment); § 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining 
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”). 
111 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). 
 2010] FEMALE INFERTILITY IN THE WORKPLACE 1315 
Seventh Circuit found that the employer had established a valid BFOQ 
defense because the fertility policy was reasonably necessary to the 
operation of Johnson Controls’ business.112 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and Justice Blackmun, writing 
for the majority, reversed the decision of the Seventh Circuit and held that 
Johnson Controls’ fetal protection policy discriminated against women in 
violation of the PDA.113  The Court found that the PDA prohibits an 
employer from discriminating against a woman because of her 
“childbearing capacity.”114 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court evaluated the classification itself 
and the employer conduct complained of using a disparate treatment 
analysis.115  The Court made it clear that the policy was discriminatory 
because it classified “on the basis of gender and childbearing capacity, 
rather than fertility alone.”116  This finding is significant for two reasons.  
First, it could be understood to suggest that classifications based on 
fertility—and, by like implication infertility—are not pregnancy-related 
medical conditions protected by the PDA.117  Second, because the policy 
facially discriminated on the basis of gender, the Court had to determine 
whether the health of unborn fetuses was reasonably necessary to the 
operation of Johnson Controls’ business; it held that it was not.118 
Put simply, Johnson Controls ran afoul of the PDA because the 
employer conduct complained of—applying a fertility policy to only 
women—was not gender-neutral.  Johnson Controls applied its fetal 
protection policy unequally with respect to men and women—fertile 
women, but not fertile men, were prohibited from working with lead 
batteries.  In dicta, the Court suggested that Johnson Controls would have 
been immune from liability if it had applied its fertility policy to fertile 
women and fertile men.119  Subsequent court decisions have erroneously 
interpreted this as suggesting that a policy that is applied to infertile 
women and infertile men would never run afoul of the PDA.120  This is 
                                                                                                                          
112 Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 898. 
113 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 199–200. 
116 Id. at 198. 
117 See infra note 122 and accompanying text (citing an Eighth Circuit case where infertility was 
alleged as the principal basis for discrimination in violation of the PDA). 
118 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202–04. 
119 See id. at 197 (“The bias in Johnson Controls’ policy is obvious.  Fertile men, but not fertile 
women, are given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular 
job.”).  This classification, the Court found, is facially discriminatory in violation of Title VII’s 
prohibition of sex discrimination:  “Johnson Controls’ policy is not neutral because it does not apply to 
the reproductive capacity of the company’s male employees in the same way as it applies to that of the 
females.”  Id. at 198–99. 
120 See Nalco II, 534 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2008); Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 
345–46 (2d Cir. 2003); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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false.  The policy at issue in Johnson Controls is distinguishable from an 
absentee policy for infertile workers.  If the employer in Johnson Controls 
had applied its policy equally to women and men, the consequences for 
each group of workers would have been the same, namely, an inability to 
work.  But, if an employer applies an absentee policy for infertile workers 
equally to women and men, then women will always suffer more because 
fertility treatments are more time-consuming for women. 
B.  The Eighth Circuit: Krauel 
Five years after the Supreme Court decided Johnson Controls, the 
Eighth Circuit considered whether the PDA covers infertility.121  In Krauel 
v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, a female employee alleged that her 
employer’s policy denying insurance coverage for her fertility treatments 
discriminated against her on the basis of her infertility, thereby violating 
the PDA.122 
Krauel, a respiratory therapist at Iowa Methodist Medical Center 
(“IMCC”), was diagnosed with endometriosis, a condition that causes 
tissue to grow abnormally outside the uterus, often causing severe pain and 
infertility.123  She had difficulty becoming pregnant naturally and 
underwent three fertility treatments, the last of which was successful.124  
IMCC denied coverage for Krauel’s fertility treatments but provided 
coverage for her pregnancy and delivery expenses.125 
Krauel advanced disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of 
liability and argued that infertility is a medical condition related to 
pregnancy because there is a causal connection—fertility causes pregnancy 
while infertility prevents pregnancy.  In other words, both affect one’s 
childbearing capacity.126  To evaluate Krauel’s argument, the Eighth 
Circuit analyzed the statutory construction of the PDA by applying the 
following rule:  “[W]hen a general term [(‘related medical conditions’)] 
follows a specific one [(‘pregnancy’ and ‘childbirth’)], the general term 
should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with 
specific enumeration.”127 
The court found that infertility was not sufficiently akin to pregnancy 
and childbirth because (1) they occur after conception, while infertility 
occurs prior to conception;128 and (2) the legislative history makes no 
                                                                                                                          
121 Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679. 
122 Id. at 676, 679. 
123 Id. at 675–76. 
124 Id. at 676. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 679. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. (emphasis added). 
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reference to fertility treatments.129  Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that the 
exclusion of infertility coverage from Krauel’s benefits plan was not in 
violation of the PDA because infertility was not a pregnancy-related 
medical condition.130  Importantly, the court also rejected Krauel’s 
argument, on the basis of insufficient statistical evidence, that the policy 
had a disparate impact on women because they undergo treatment and bear 
a greater proportion of the costs; however, the court’s holding suggests that 
disparate impact might be shown where statistical evidence is sufficient to 
meet the burden of proof.131 
C.  The Second Circuit: Saks 
In 2003, the Second Circuit affirmed a ruling nearly identical to the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Krauel.132  The plaintiff in Saks v. Franklin 
Covey Co., Rochelle Saks, claimed that her employer’s health benefits 
plan, which excluded coverage for surgical impregnation procedures, 
violated the PDA’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of pregnancy 
and “related medical conditions.”133  Saks also argued that the plan 
discriminated on the basis of sex because surgical impregnation procedures 
by their very nature are sex-specific, as they can only be performed on 
women.134 
The court noted the fundamental problem with the PDA:  “Related 
medical conditions . . . clearly embraces more than pregnancy itself . . . .  
The question is how much more.”135  To answer this question, the court 
analyzed the text of the statute by “look[ing] to the particular statutory 
language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a 
whole.”136  The court found: 
Title VII is, at its core, a statute that prohibits 
discrimination “because of,” inter alia, an individual’s sex.  
The PDA modified Title VII by requiring that discrimination 
on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions” be considered discrimination “because of sex.”  
Because reproductive capacity is common to both men and 
women, we do not read the PDA as introducing a completely 
new classification of prohibited discrimination based solely 
on reproductive capacity.  Rather, the PDA . . . [prohibits] . . . 
                                                                                                                          
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 680. 
131 Id. at 681. 
132 Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 347 (2d Cir. 2003). 
133 Id. at 345 (internal citations omitted). 
134 Id. at 346. 
135 Id. at 345. 
136 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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discrimination based on “childbearing capacity . . . .”137 
The court reasoned that reproductive capacity—fertility or infertility—
as opposed to childbearing capacity, is gender-neutral and outside of the 
scope of the PDA because infertility affects men and women in equal 
proportions.138  Specifically, the court noted that “[i]ncluding infertility 
within the PDA’s protection . . . would result in the anomaly of defining a 
class that simultaneously includes equal numbers of both sexes and yet is 
somehow vulnerable to sex discrimination.”139  Affirming the decision of 
the district court, the Second Circuit held that an employer’s health plan 
excluding coverage for fertility treatments performed solely on women was 
lawful.140 
Importantly, the court expressly declined to consider whether an 
infertile female employee would be able to state a claim under the PDA or 
Title VII for an adverse employment action taken against her because she 
took numerous sick days to undergo surgical impregnation procedures.141  
This is likely because the court foresaw the disparate impact such a policy 
would have on women. 
D.  The Seventh Circuit: Pacourek, Nalco I, and Nalco II 
Although it would not be until July 2008 that the Seventh Circuit 
considered the PDA’s coverage of infertility, the District Court of the 
Northern District of Illinois addressed the question in 1994.142  In Pacourek 
v. Inland Steel Co., the court held, on grounds that the PDA is to be 
broadly construed, that infertility is a pregnancy-related medical 
condition.143  Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit would back-pedal on this 
holding fourteen years later, in Nalco II, by limiting the scope of PDA 
coverage to only infertile women undergoing fertility treatments.144 
1.  Pacourek 
Charlene Pacourek, diagnosed with a medical condition that rendered 
her infertile, entered an experimental fertility treatment program at the 
University of Chicago.145  Pacourek alleged that upon notifying her 
employer of her efforts to become pregnant, her supervisor verbally abused 
her about her infertility, expressed doubt as to her ability to become 
pregnant, and was skeptical of her ability to combine pregnancy and her 
                                                                                                                          
137 Id. at 345–46 (internal citations omitted). 
138 Id. at 346. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 349. 
141 Id. at 346 n.4. 
142 Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1396–97 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
143 Id. at 1402–03. 
144 Nalco II, 534 F.3d 644, 648–49 (7th Cir. 2008). 
145 Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1396. 
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career.146  Pacourek’s supervisor also informed her that she was a “high 
risk” employee and subsequently terminated her.147 
The court in Pacourek was the first to recognize the unique 
relationship between fertility, women, and the workplace:  “Only women 
can become pregnant; stereotypes based on pregnancy and related medical 
conditions have been a barrier to women’s economic advancement; and 
classifications based on pregnancy and related medical conditions are 
never gender-neutral.”148  Unlike in Krauel, the court made no distinction 
between medical conditions that occur pre-conception and post-
conception; Johnson Controls precluded that reasoning since the Supreme 
Court held that the PDA applies before pregnancy.149 
The court held that “discrimination against persons who intend to or 
can potentially become pregnant is discrimination against women, which is 
the kind of truism the PDA wrote into law.”150  The court added that “[t]o 
hold . . . that it is illegal under the PDA to discriminate on the basis of 
potential or intended pregnancy, is not necessarily to hold that the 
plaintiff’s condition [of infertility] is related to pregnancy for purposes of 
the PDA.”151 That is a separate, additional analysis that the court 
undertook. 
Like the courts in Saks and Krauel, the district court in Pacourek 
looked first to the legislative history of the PDA for guidance.152  But 
rather than take a restrictive approach to statutory interpretation, the court 
looked at the statute through the lens of a “well settled canon of statutory 
construction that remedial statutes, such as civil rights laws, are to be 
broadly construed.”153 
The court noted that the expansive language prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” 
supported its holding that female infertility is a medical condition related 
to pregnancy and childbirth for purposes of the PDA.154  The modifier 
“related,” the court found, is purposefully broad and suggests that the Act 
applies to the whole childbearing process, not just to that which occurs 
post-conception.155  The court noted that this reading was consistent with 
the legislature’s intent to repudiate Gilbert and cited the floor debate 
                                                                                                                          
146 Id. at 1396, 1401. 
147 Id. at 1397. 
148 Id. at 1401. 
149 Id. at 1402. 
150 Id. at 1401. 
151 Id. at 1402. 
152 Id. at 1402–03. 
153 Id. at 1402 (internal quotations omitted). 
154 Id.  But, in an effort to quell employers’ fears, the court noted that this decision did not instruct 
employers to treat a woman’s infertility in a certain way; it only requires that they treat her medical 
condition neutrally.  Id. at 1403. 
155 Id. at 1402. 
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testimony of Senator Harrison Williams: 
[B]ecause of their capacity to become pregnant, women have 
been viewed as marginal workers not deserving the full 
benefits of compensation and advancement . . . . In some of 
these cases, the employer refused to consider women for 
particular types of jobs on the grounds that they might 
become pregnant. . . . The overall effect of discrimination 
against women because they might become pregnant . . . is to 
relegate women in general . . . to a second-class status.156 
The court added that “once it is determined that a classification is in 
contravention of the PDA, that classification is not to be further tested with 
an eye toward approving the classification if it is found to be gender 
neutral in its specific content.”157  In other words, a painstaking search for 
gender neutrality based on hypothetical situations is insufficient to strip the 
classification of protection. 
2.  Nalco I 
After Pacourek, more than a decade passed before the Seventh Circuit 
considered whether the PDA protects infertility.  In 2003, Cheryl Hall, a 
sales secretary, informed her boss that she wished to take a leave of 
absence from work to undergo fertility treatment.158  Around this same 
time, her company began a massive reorganization and consolidation of its 
offices, requiring the elimination of one of two sales secretary positions.159  
Hall’s first treatment failed, and she again asked for time off to undergo a 
second round of treatment.160  Her employer terminated her two weeks 
later.161  Hall’s supervisor had discussed the termination with an employee 
relations manager whose notes reflected that Hall “missed a lot of work 
due to health” and cited “absenteeism” due to “infertility treatments.”162  
At the time of her termination, Hall’s supervisor explained that it was “in 
[her] best interest due to [her] health condition.”163 
Hall filed a complaint with the Northern District of Illinois alleging 
that she was terminated in violation of the PDA.164  In an unpublished 
September 12, 2006, opinion, the district court held that infertility is not a 
pregnancy-related medical condition protected by the PDA and granted 
                                                                                                                          
156 Id. (internal citations and emphasis omitted). 
157 Id. at 1404. 
158 Nalco II, 534 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2008). 
159 Id. at 646. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Hall v. Nalco Co. (Nalco I), No. 04-C-7294, 2006 WL 2699337, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 
2006). 
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judgment in favor of Nalco.165  In doing so, the court ignored the reasoning 
in Pacourek and relied instead on the same arguments found in the Second 
Circuit’s opinion in Saks and the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Krauel.166 
The court found that no sex discrimination occurred because infertility 
affects men and women with equal frequency.167  To hold otherwise, the 
court explained, would be incompatible with the PDA’s definition, 
“because of sex,” since it would result in the anomaly of including equal 
numbers of both sexes.168  The court failed to realize that the employer 
conduct complained of—terminating employees who take time off for 
fertility treatment—will always affect women more than men because 
fertility treatment is more onerous and time-consuming for women. 
The court also noted that the legislative history contained no reference 
to fertility treatments.169  As discussed in Part IV, this is necessarily so 
because fertility treatments were in their infancy in 1978.  It was not until 
more invasive and time-consuming procedures became widely available 
that fertility treatments proved burdensome for women in the workforce. 
3.  Nalco II 
Cheryl Hall appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of her employer, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit heard arguments on June 4, 2007.170  Judge Sykes, writing for the 
majority, held that Hall had indeed stated a claim for sex discrimination 
under the PDA and reversed the decision of the lower court, remanding the 
case for further fact-finding.171  This opinion was novel because although 
the court agreed with the Eighth and Second Circuits that the PDA does 
not protect infertility, the court held that the PDA does protect women 
undergoing fertility treatments.172  The court recognized fertility treatment 
(specifically, IVF) as a treatment that “takes weeks to complete” and 
sometimes requires “multiple treatments,” a treatment that burdens women 
more than men.173 
The Seventh Circuit subtly faulted the district court for relying on Saks 
and Krauel.174  First, the court noted that any reliance on Saks was 
misplaced because the Second Circuit expressly declined to consider the 
                                                                                                                          
165 Id. at *3. 
166 Id. at *2. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Nalco II, 534 F.3d 644, 644 (7th Cir. 2008). 
171 Id. at 645. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 645–46. 
174 See id. at 647, 648 nn.1–2 (finding that Saks declined to consider a case in which a woman 
took time off to undergo fertility treatments and that Krauel mistakenly asserted that the PDA applies 
only post-conception). 
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question presented in Nalco.175  Second, the court noted that Saks and 
Krauel misconstrued the holding of Johnson Controls.176  While the court 
acknowledged that Johnson Controls suggested that infertility is gender-
neutral, it nonetheless found that “even where (in)fertility [a gender-neutral 
condition] is at issue, the employer conduct complained of must actually be 
gender neutral.”177  The employer’s conduct in Johnson Controls ran afoul 
of this mandate by treating fertile female employees and fertile male 
employees differently: only females were barred from working with 
lead.178 
The court found the same was true in the case of Cheryl Hall.  Nalco’s 
conduct—terminating employees for taking time off to undergo IVF—only 
affects women because IVF involves a surgical impregnation procedure 
that can only be performed on women.179  It is thus irrelevant that infertility 
affects men and women equally; the employer conduct complained of was 
not gender-neutral because only women take significant time off to 
undergo IVF. 
There is one significant difference, however, between Johnson 
Controls and Nalco II: the Supreme Court analyzed Johnson Controls as a 
disparate treatment case, whereas the Nalco II court appears to have 
analyzed Hall’s claim as a disparate impact case.  The court would have 
been wise to have explicitly stated this point, thereby clarifying the parties’ 
respective burdens of proof.  By not doing so, the court opened up the 
possibility that Hall could have argued a disparate treatment or mixed-
motives case on remand.180 
V.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HALL V. NALCO 
A.  An Uphill Battle on Remand 
Hall’s attorney, Eugene Hollander, was quoted in the Wall Street 
Journal after the decision in Nalco II, claiming that because of this ruling, 
women will have to worry less about the “‘repercussions of taking time off 
for IVF.’”181  This analysis ignores the fact that plaintiffs such as Hall still 
face an uphill battle on remand.182  The Seventh Circuit merely held that 
Hall had indeed stated a cognizable claim of sex discrimination on which a 
                                                                                                                          
175 Id. at 648 n.2. 
176 Id. at 648 n.1. 
177 Id. at 648 (first emphasis added). 
178 United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 191–92 (1991). 
179 Nalco II, 534 F.3d at 648–49. 
180 The court held that issues of fact existed as to who terminated Hall and whether the decision 
maker had knowledge of her IVF treatments.  Id. at 649. 
181 Shellenbarger, supra note 49. 
182 Joanna Grossman, Can a Woman Be Fired for Absenteeism Related to Fertility Treatments? A 
Federal Appeals Court Says No, FINDLAW, Aug. 19, 2008, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
GROSSMAN/20080819.HTML. 
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trier of fact could find that she was terminated based on sex-specific 
fertility treatments.183  Hall wisely settled, instead of pursuing her case in 
court.  If she had litigated her claim, she would have faced difficulty 
proving her case, regardless of whether she framed it as one of disparate 
impact, disparate treatment, or mixed motives.   
It would have been difficult for Hall to be successful on remand if she 
framed her case as one of disparate impact because the Seventh Circuit has 
found that PDA plaintiffs cannot succeed under the concept of disparate 
impact in cases involving absenteeism, since attendance at work is a 
business necessity.184  In Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, the Seventh 
Circuit recognized that PDA plaintiffs might attack a company’s policy on 
absenteeism as having a disparate impact if it could be shown that the 
policy weighed more heavily on members of a protected class (e.g., 
pregnant employees or women undergoing fertility treatments) and if this 
policy was not justified by a business necessity.185  The court found that the 
second prong will never be satisfied because the concept of disparate 
impact is intended only for cases in which employers impose eligibility 
requirements not really necessary for the job, such as height or weight 
requirements.186  Attendance will always be necessary for a job.  Like a 
pregnant woman who is absent from work because of morning sickness, 
Hall’s disparate impact claim would fail because an employer is under no 
obligation to excuse women from having to satisfy the necessary 
requirements of their jobs.187 
If Hall had litigated her case, she may have been more successful if she 
framed her claim as a disparate treatment case.  Even then, however, her 
employer would have two arguments: (1) it terminated her as part of its 
reorganization process, not because of her fertility treatments; and (2) even 
if it terminated her for getting fertility treatments, her attendance at work is 
a BFOQ. 
In response to the first argument, Hall’s attorney would likely have 
argued a mixed-motives case because Hall’s IVF attempts and the 
company reorganization were in close temporal proximity.188  This would 
reduce Hall’s burden of proof.  Hall did not need to prove that her sex was 
a but-for cause of her termination, only that it was one factor in her 
                                                                                                                          
183 Nalco II, 534 F.3d at 645. 
184 Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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187 Id. at 583–84. 
188 A plaintiff states a cognizable sex discrimination claim when sex, in conjunction with a 
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employer’s decisionmaking process.189  The comments of Hall’s supervisor 
and the notes of the employee-relations manager could have been used as 
circumstantial evidence to create an inference of discrimination.190 
The timing of her supervisor’s remarks is critical.191  When terminating 
Hall, her supervisor told her that it “was in [her] best interest due to [her] 
health condition.”192  This proves that a nexus existed between Hall’s 
fertility treatments and her termination.  Unfortunately, the record is 
somewhat vague as to whether the supervisor, on her own, made the 
decision to fire Hall.  If her supervisor was the decision maker, then Hall 
could have had a strong claim that her comment was not a stray remark, 
but instead shows discriminatory intent.193 
Nalco’s second likely argument—that attendance at work is a BFOQ— 
would be based on the premise that strict attendance is reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation or essence of Nalco’s business and that 
Nalco had a reasonable factual basis for believing that all women receiving 
fertility treatments would be able to perform the job inefficiently.194 
One Seventh Circuit case analyzing the BFOQ in the context of a 
pregnancy discrimination claim is worth noting.  In Maldonado v. U.S. 
Bank & Manufacturer’s Bank, a female bank teller claimed she was fired 
after notifying her employer that she was pregnant.195  In fact, the bank 
conceded that it had fired the bank teller for this reason.196  The bank 
argued that her pregnancy and anticipated due date would have made her 
unavailable in the summer months, a qualification necessary for the normal 
operation of the business.197  Assuming that summer availability was a 
BFOQ, the court considered situations where an employer might be 
justified in taking anticipatory action against a pregnant employee: “an 
                                                                                                                          
189 See id. (stating that sex need only be “a” motivating factor). 
190 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151–54 (2000) (holding that 
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191 Compare Barnes v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214–15 (D. Kan. 2007) 
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192 Nalco II, 534 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original). 
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194 See ROBERT H. BLANK, FETAL PROTECTION IN THE WORKPLACE 40 (1993) (“The BFOQ 
exception has generally been interpreted very narrowly by the courts.”). 
195 Maldonado v. U.S. Bank & Mfr.’s Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 765 (7th Cir. 1999). 
196 Id. at 766. 
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employer cannot take anticipatory action unless it has a good faith basis, 
supported by sufficiently strong evidence, that the normal inconveniences 
of an employee’s pregnancy will require special treatment.”198 
The court noted that it will rarely be demonstrable that a woman will 
be unable to meet a BFOQ in the future, but it did suggest that this burden 
may be met in cases where an employee announces that she will be 
unavailable to work in the future and explicitly requests special 
treatment.199  Because the bank was merely speculating as to the 
employee’s availability in the summer months, the court held that the bank 
was not justified in firing the plaintiff.200 
Unlike the plaintiff in Maldonado, Cheryl Hall specifically asked for 
time off in order to undergo fertility treatments.201  Therefore, Nalco may 
have tried to show that Hall was fired for her anticipated absenteeism 
based on the employee-relation manager’s notes, which stated 
“absenteeism—infertility treatments.”202  Nalco’s BFOQ defense would 
likely have succeeded unless Hall could prove that her supervisor’s 
comment indicated that it was not her absenteeism, but her fertility 
treatments that motivated her employer to fire her.203  In any event, Hall 
would have faced an uphill battle on remand since the manager’s notes 
(“missed a lot of work due to health” and “absenteeism—infertility 
treatments”) might have counteracted the sufficiency of her supervisor’s 
remarks (that termination was in her “best interest due to [her] health 
condition”) in creating an inference of sex discrimination.204 
B.  A Battle that Never Ends: Still No Insurance Coverage 
Even if Hall had gone to trial and was successful on remand, she 
would still be responsible for the crippling costs of IVF.  The Nalco 
decision is an incomplete solution for infertile working women because its 
limited holding—extending protection to women undergoing fertility 
treatment, but not to all infertile women—does not extend to cases in 
which an employer excludes costly fertility treatments from its health plan. 
Nalco II makes it unlawful to discriminate against a woman with 
respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment because of her use of fertility treatments.  This assumes that 
the woman has already obtained medical treatment for her infertility, 
suggesting that the employer is under no legal obligation to cover the cost 
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of treatment.  If, on the other hand, the law protected women with 
infertility much in the same way that the law protects pregnancy,205 then 
employers would be required to provide insurance coverage for fertility 
treatments. 
Numerous policy rationales support the argument that employers ought 
to provide health plans that cover fertility treatment.  First, providing 
coverage for fertility treatments is similar to providing coverage for 
contraceptives, since both affect one’s ability to become pregnant.206  
Second, providing coverage can help attract and retain workers, ultimately 
improving a company’s bottom line.207  Third, contrary to critics’ 
arguments, providing coverage for treatments causes only a slight increase 
in employees’ premiums.208  Fourth, the ability to have children is a human 
right and employees seem to recognize this, as evidenced by their 
willingness to pay increased premiums so that infertile women may receive 
treatment.209 
Employers should be required to provide insurance coverage for 
female fertility treatments that help increase the chances for pregnancy 
because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has 
ruled that employers must provide coverage for female contraceptives, 
which help decrease the chances for pregnancy.210  In 2000, the EEOC 
concluded that employers who fail to provide insurance coverage for 
female contraceptive drugs and devices may be discriminating against 
females (and males with female dependents) if they provide insurance 
coverage for other preventative treatment.211 
The EEOC found that a classification based on contraception is a 
classification based on pregnancy for two reasons.  First, the EEOC 
concluded that avoiding being pregnant and being pregnant are the same 
for purposes of the PDA.212  In reaching this conclusion, the EEOC relied 
on the holding in Johnson Controls that the PDA protects “a woman’s 
                                                                                                                          
205 The PDA states: 
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited 
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; 
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be 
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits 
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their 
ability or inability to work . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (emphasis added). 
206 See infra notes 210–16 and accompanying text. 
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208 See infra notes 222–29 and accompanying text. 
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210 EEOC, Commission Decision on Coverage of Contraception, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/ 
docs/decision-contraception.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) [hereinafter EEOC Decision on Coverage 
of Contraception]. 
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potential for pregnancy, as well as pregnancy itself.”213  Second, the EEOC 
rejected the respondents’ argument that a plan barring coverage for all 
contraception for women and men, equally, was not discriminatory 
because prescription contraceptives are available only for women.214  It 
might also have added that while both men and women can prevent 
pregnancy, it is easy and cheap for men to do so, but can be difficult and 
expensive for women.  
In much the same way, an employer’s health plan excluding IVF 
treatment coverage for men and women will always affect women more 
than men because surgical impregnation procedures are only available for 
women.  Akin to denying contraception coverage, denying IVF coverage 
always burdens women more than men because fertility treatments are 
cheap and easy for men but difficult and expensive for women.215  In 
addition, if avoiding being pregnant and being pregnant are equivalent 
under the PDA, then it follows that trying to become pregnant is also 
protected.  Finally, because the majority of employer-sponsored health 
plans provide coverage for contraceptives intended to prevent 
pregnancy,216 they should also be required under the PDA to provide 
coverage for fertility treatments intended to achieve pregnancy. 
Including coverage for fertility treatments is in an employer’s best 
interest because doing so can help attract and retain workers.  For example, 
Erin Davis loved her job at a public relations firm, but she quit because her 
company’s health insurance would not pay for her high-tech fertility 
treatments.217  She found Sprint, a telecommunications company, one of 
only about twenty percent of large firms whose insurance plan covered 
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214 Id.  See also Joanna Grossman, Insurance Coverage for Birth Control: The EEOC Speaks, 
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216 In 2002, seventy-eight percent of workers with employer-sponsored health plans had coverage 
for oral contraceptives.  Memorandum from The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation on Latest Findings 
on Employer-Based Coverage of Contraception to Interested Parties (Aug. 7, 2002), available at 
http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14079. 
217 Julie Appleby, Pricey Infertility Care Sparks Insurance Clash, USA TODAY, Dec. 19, 2001, at 
1B. 
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fertility treatments.218  Even though she was paid less at this new job, she 
came out ahead because Sprint covered four IVF attempts, the equivalent 
of approximately $48,000.219 
Including coverage for fertility treatments can also improve worker 
morale and encourage honesty in the workplace.  Sam Albimino moved 
from Virginia to Illinois, a state that requires insurers to pay for infertility 
coverage, so that his wife could afford IVF treatment.  He found that he 
was more satisfied with his job and that his productivity increased because 
of it.220  Ben Willmott of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development in the United Kingdom emphasizes, “It’s much better to have 
a [business] culture where people can be open than one where they take 
time off without being entirely honest about it.”221 
Admittedly, providing coverage for fertility treatments, like any other 
expansion in coverage, will increase premiums for employees; but critics 
have grossly exaggerated the extent to which premiums will increase.  
Insurers argue that requiring coverage will send premiums skyrocketing.222  
Insurers used this same logic to protest mandatory coverage of pregnancy 
prior to the enactment of the PDA.223  But just as this argument proved 
inflated after the passage of the PDA,224 so too is it unconvincing in the 
case of infertility coverage.  One study found that coverage of fertility 
treatments would increase premiums by only $3.14 per employee, per 
year.225  Employers argue that this figure is wrong since mandating 
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coverage could lead to a steep increase in the utilization of fertility 
treatment by employees.226  Some critics suggest the figure would raise 
premiums by as much as twenty dollars per year.227  In reality, studies 
report that the utilization of IVF in states that require coverage is only 
about 2.8 times the rate in states that do not require coverage of fertility 
treatments.228  In addition, research suggests that increased demand will 
lead to increased supply, and the more IVF clinics there are, the lower the 
cost of treatment.229 
Even if the cost is slight, why should employees be required to foot the 
bill, in the form of higher premiums, for fertility treatments?  Opponents 
argue that having children is a lifestyle choice, akin to cosmetic surgery, 
that should not be subsidized by other employees.230  In fact, eighty percent 
of insurers treat it as a lifestyle choice not deserving of the insurance cost-
spreading mechanism.231  This logic is unsound.  Fifty percent of pregnant 
women in America have chosen to have children, and insurance covers 
their condition.232  Similarly, women on prescription contraception have 
chosen not to have children, and the EEOC has held that the PDA requires 
coverage of contraception in most cases.233  So, too, should insurance cover 
infertile women who have chosen to get help having children. 
For the millions of women trying so desperately to conceive, 
childbearing is not a luxury akin to cosmetic surgery; it is a human right, 
whose benefits far outweigh the costs.  A cost-benefit analysis proves that 
society tends to agree.  If each IVF cycle costs $12,000 and has a twenty-
five percent chance of resulting in a live birth, the average cost per baby is 
$48,000.  Do the average benefits of a birth from IVF outweigh the 
$48,000 cost?  One survey asked 231 respondents of different ages and 
income levels what they would be willing to pay in increased taxes for a 
public program that would provide access to IVF for couples in 
Massachusetts.234  The average amount was $32 per year.235  This study 
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suggests that people would be more than willing to pay a $20 increase in 
premiums, the highest estimate provided by opponents, each year to 
provide IVF coverage. 
Importantly, although this Note posits that bearing children is a human 
right, not a luxury, it may be necessary to draw a line when this right 
becomes abused.  Lines have been drawn on other rights, such as the First 
Amendment’s freedom of speech.236  Even though most women are 
capable of self-regulating the number of times they use IVF, thereby 
keeping the cost of premiums in check, there will always be women, as 
evidenced by the highly publicized “octomom,”  who do not know when to 
stop IVF treatments.237  Because of this, New Jersey recently proposed 
legislation limiting insurance coverage of IVF to women with fewer than 
two children.238    
VI.  SOLVING THE PROBLEM: RECOGNIZING INFERTILITY 
This Note proposes that Congress is in the best position to clarify that 
infertility falls within the scope of the PDA.  So long as courts feel 
constrained by the Johnson Controls dicta, they will continue to view 
infertility as gender-neutral.  It would take a brave court to break this 
pattern, but the legislature is free to do so without consideration of Johnson 
Controls.  To date, plaintiffs alleging infertility discrimination have fallen 
into one of two groups: plaintiffs who were terminated for undergoing 
fertility treatments or plaintiffs whose employer-funded health plans 
denied coverage for fertility treatments.  Accordingly, court holdings are 
typically limited to the context in which infertility discrimination arose.239  
To solve the two-fold problem that working women face, Congress should 
again clarify the definition of sex discrimination and should articulate that 
infertility is a pregnancy-related medical condition protected by Title VII, 
as amended by the PDA.  Congress has shown its inclination to clarify the 
definition of “sex” in Title VII when it passed the PDA, and this Note 
encourages Congress to do so again. 
It is important that Congress clarify that infertility is a pregnancy-
related medical condition because a federal law, if drafted correctly, would 
overcome ERISA and require all (or at least some) employers to offer 
infertility insurance.240  Although Congress can act without regard to 
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legislative purpose, recognition of infertility is consistent with the 
legislative purpose of Title VII.  Critics of such inclusion argue that 
Congress must have intended to exclude infertility from the scope of the 
PDA because it is not discussed anywhere in the legislative history or in 
the language of the Act.241  But this absence does not necessarily mandate 
such a conclusion.  Instead, this absence likely reflects society’s general 
reluctance to discuss infertility, which, as one legal scholar noted in 1978, 
was considered a “silent” problem.242  Infertility did not gain the national 
attention it now enjoys until July 1978 when Baby Louise was born in 
England via IVF.243  By this time, the majority of legislative hearings on 
the PDA had already occurred.244  As of October 31, 1978, when President 
Carter signed the PDA into law, no babies had been born via IVF in the 
United States.  The only medical treatments available for infertility in the 
United States when the PDA was passed were hormone therapy, ovarian 
stimulation drugs, and sperm donations.245  While these treatments were 
sometimes successful, they provided no relief for women whose bodies 
were unable to fertilize eggs.246  Such procedures were also less costly and 
less time-consuming for women than IVF.247  It is no surprise then, that 
Congress did not anticipate the work-related problems that infertile 
working women undergoing IVF treatment would face in the years ahead. 
A strict adherence to textualism and intentionalism, such as that found 
in the Eighth Circuit’s Krauel decision, is misguided because it does not 
take into account changed circumstances and scientific advancements like 
IVF.248  William Eskridge, one of the leading scholars on the statutory 
interpretation of civil rights laws, has acknowledged that treating statutes 
as static can render them irrelevant, while treating them as dynamic can 
render them applicable:  “When the world changes, there are several things 
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that can happen to a statute.  It can become irrelevant and basically wither 
away . . . [o]r the statute can remain relevant but . . . can change its form to 
deal with the policy chasms introduced by the obsolescence of some of its 
assumptions.”249 
To illustrate his point, Eskridge points to United Steel Workers of 
America v. Weber, a case in which the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII 
to reflect its statutory purpose instead of its original legislative intent.250  
Legislative intent can be understood to be the considerations the legislature 
had in mind when passing legislation.  In contrast, legislative purpose 
relates to the overall goal of legislation.  In Weber, the plaintiff, a white 
worker, protested his employer’s affirmative action plan, which was 
designed to eliminate racial imbalances in an almost entirely white 
workforce.251  Even though Title VII was enacted to prohibit 
discrimination based on race, the Court upheld the plan since it was in 
conformity with the purpose of Title VII, a remedial statute, to end the 
history of discrimination against African Americans in the United States.252  
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist accused the majority of acting like “escape 
artists” to evade what he saw as the statute’s static prohibition against 
taking race into account when making employment decisions.253  Justice 
Rehnquist maintained that that such a result could not possibly have been 
enacted in 1964.254 
But the Weber majority, like the district court in Pacourek, did not use 
evasive tactics to avoid adherence to the law.  Instead, both courts 
recognized that civil rights statutes are remedial and are to be liberally 
construed using the statutory language and legislative purpose; only then 
can the laws be adapted to deal with current issues facing the courts.255 
Adopting the approach advanced by Eskridge, the language of the 
PDA supports the conclusion that the statutory purpose of the PDA is to 
protect women who suffer from a “medical condition rendering [them] 
unable to become pregnant naturally.”256  It reads in part: 
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, 
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and 
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
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related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar 
in their ability or inability to work . . . .257 
The noun “women” in the second clause makes it clear that any 
pregnancy-related medical condition (such as infertility) must necessarily 
relate to a female-based condition.258  Because of the female’s unique 
capacity to become pregnant, it is likely that only women battling 
infertility would be a protected class under the PDA.  The relationship of 
male infertility to female pregnancy is likely too attenuated to constitute a 
protected class under the PDA.  Of course, men may still challenge an 
employer’s policy giving preferential treatment to infertile women, but not 
infertile men; however, this legal claim would likely be framed under the 
larger umbrella of sex discrimination, not the more specific claim of 
pregnancy discrimination.  This result is logical since most published 
opinions thus far involving discrimination claims based on infertility under 
the PDA have been filed by women.  This is probably because IVF—the 
most time-consuming and costly of all fertility treatments—will always 
burden women more than men.259  As Congress noted, the PDA was not 
enacted to protect men, but instead to give women “the right to choose 
both [work and family], to be financially and legally protected before, 
during, and after [their] pregnancies.”260 
VII.  UNTIL THEN, WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE WORKING WOMEN? 
Many women, unlike Hall, keep their fertility treatments secret from 
their employers for personal reasons and simply cite unspecified “medical 
reasons” for time off.261  According to one woman, secrecy “made it easier 
for me to just do my job instead of having people wonder if I was pregnant, 
wonder if I was going to leave, etc.”262  But if these women are fired for 
their absences, it is unlikely they will be able to launch a successful 
pregnancy discrimination claim absent proof that their employers knew 
they were undergoing fertility treatments.  Pregnant women, on the other 
hand, by virtue of their physical appearance, may be able to prove that 
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their employer was aware of their pregnancies even if they made no verbal 
revelation.  The special nature of infertility suggests that a woman should 
give her employer notice that she is undergoing fertility treatments so as to 
establish a record that her employer had direct knowledge and terminated 
her on the basis of these treatments. 
As Maldonado illustrates, even a pregnant woman runs the risk of 
being legally terminated when an employer is put on guard that she may 
require time off.263  Therefore, current law suggests that before asking for 
time off, a woman should inquire about her employer’s absentee policy for 
those with illnesses.  If an employer allows employees with illnesses to 
take time off for curative medical treatments but refuses to allow a woman 
to take time off for fertility treatments, then under Nalco II, a female 
plaintiff may be able to establish a prima facie case that she was terminated 
on the basis of her fertility treatment.264  Admittedly, the advice that a 
woman should report her infertility to her employer, but not necessarily ask 
for absences, is unrealistic: after all, the only reason most women disclose 
their infertility is to explain their absences from work when they are 
receiving treatment.265 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The Eighth, Second, and Seventh Circuits have recognized infertility 
as a gender-neutral condition that affects men and women equally.266  
Emanuel Cellar, a Democrat from New York, Chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee, and floor leader for the Civil Rights Bill of 1964, 
warned of the shortcomings inherent in treating the sexes equally and 
insisted on their uniqueness:  “You know, the French have a phrase for it 
when they speak of women and men . . . ‘vive la difference.’  I think the 
French are right.”267  Cellar’s approach is best suited to understanding the 
innate differences between female and male infertility.  Women are unique 
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because only they have the capacity to become pregnant.  It is this special 
nature that has historically subjected them to the effects of the stereotype 
that women are marginal workers—a stereotype that proponents of the 
PDA clearly intended to combat.268 
Fertility was once a reason to discriminate against female employees, 
and today infertility is used in much the same way.269  Employers have an 
extra incentive to fire infertile women who undergo fertility treatments 
because fertility treatments can last indefinitely, greatly straining financial 
and staff resources.  To ensure that the legislative purpose of Title VII is 
best served, Congress should clarify that female infertility is a pregnancy-
related medical condition under the PDA, as did the court in Pacourek.270  
Recognizing infertility will ensure that infertile women receive the same 
health insurance coverage that their pregnant counterparts enjoy.  To 
recognize infertility as within the PDA’s scope will, at the very least, free 
women from worrying about how to obtain the necessary time off from 
work and how to pay for their costly treatments so that they may 
concentrate on how to conceive. 
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